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Chapter One
Keeping the Internet Free in the Americas
Dawn Carla Nunziato1

Introduction
In the workshop “Freedom of Expression and the Internet: Regulatory Aspects in Latin
America" organized by Professor Eduardo Bertoni, legal experts from the Western Hemisphere
convened to discuss how to facilitate freedom of expression on the Internet. We considered how
to balance the harms that may arise from free speech (including harms to privacy, honor,
intellectual property, public welfare) against its benefits, as well as the proper role of Internet
service providers as intermediaries in protecting and facilitating Internet free speech. We
examined the proper role of governments in protecting Internet free speech and in punishing
harmful speech -- directly and by regulating intermediaries. We also examined the role of
governments in regulating Internet service providers to facilitate the free flow of information on
the Internet. In what follows, I offer my introductory observations and recommendations for
keeping the Internet free, with an emphasis on the role of Internet service providers and
governments in facilitating freedom of expression in the Americas.
Citizens of the Americas today rely on the Internet as a forum for expression and
communications to an unprecedented degree. Internet penetration in Latin America is rapidly
increasing, as countries realize the importance of the Internet to their economies and to their
citizens’ participation in global forums for expression. In this period of rapid development, some
countries in Latin America have emerged as leaders in protecting freedom of expression on the
Internet. Chile, for example, was the first country in the world to enact net neutrality legislation,
ensuring that its ISPs cannot discriminate against content or applications made available to its
citizens. In contrast, other countries in Latin America are taking steps in a direction that is
decidedly less supportive of Internet free speech. Venezuela, for example, plans to establish an
Internet chokepoint at its border to block its citizens from accessing speech that is “aimed at
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creating social unrest or disturbing public order.”2 In recent years, Brazilian courts have ordered
the overly broad blocking of Internet content, and indeed, once ordered all access to YouTube to
be blocked in that country.3 Developments in filtering technologies have now advanced to the
point where it is feasible for governments to censor speech that is disfavored by the government
and/or by certain individuals.
Given these developments, the time is right to focus on
recommendations to governments in Latin America to enable them to preserve the Internet as a
forum for free expression and to forgo the temptation to co-opt the Internet as a tool for
government control and manipulation. In what follows, I reflect on the efforts of the United
States and other countries to navigate these waters, and offer recommendations to protect
freedom of expression on the Internet in the Americas.
I . Government Regulation of Internet Service Providers
Internet service providers serve as the gatekeepers for access to the entirety of the
Internet’s content and as such, have vast power to control what information is received and
communicated by their subscribers. The existence of this power raises the question of under
what circumstances ISPs should be required or permitted to exercise this power to prohibit their
subscribers from accessing allegedly harmful, illegal, or disfavored content. That is, should
governments regulate ISPs to require them to restrict access to material that is alleged – by the
government or by private parties – to be harmful? Alternatively, governments might enact net
neutrality legislation to prohibit ISPs from exercising this power to control their subscribers’
access to lawful content. As an example of the first, governments might require their ISPs to
prohibit their subscribers from accessing content that the government deems harmful, such as
Venezuela is attempting to do. Or governments might require ISPs to block all access to content
that an individual alleges to be harmful, as has occurred in Brazil. Or ISPs themselves might
choose to block their subscribers’ access to content that the ISP itself determines is undesirable,
such as content or applications offered by a competitor or content espousing a social or political
viewpoint with which the ISP disagrees. In what follows, I suggest, first, that ISPs generally
should be broadly immunized from all liability for hosting harmful content, and second, that ISPs
should be legally required to facilitate access to all legal content, without discrimination or
censorship.
A. Internet Service Providers Should Be Largely Immune from Liability for Facilitating Access
to Harmful Content
Governments face difficult choices regarding whether and how to hold ISPs liable for
facilitating access to harmful content, whether by hosting such content, as in the case of
2
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YouTube, or providing links to such content, as in the case of Google. The most speechprotective regime would immunize ISPs from any such intermediary liability and would refrain
from imposing any obligation on ISPs to remove or disable access to such harmful content –
absent a narrowly tailored court order adjudicating such content to be illegal. Conversely, the
most speech-restrictive regime would render ISPs directly liable for the harmful third-party
content, regardless of whether the ISPs have actual or constructive notice of such content. And
there are many possibilities between these two extremes.
The imposition of strict liability on Internet service providers for facilitating allegedly
harmful content made available by subscribers has severe consequences for freedom of
expression, as it requires ISPs to actively and closely monitor all such content and would
incentivize ISPs to remove any content that is even questionably harmful or illegal. Such a
system has ultimately been avoided by most countries in the region. Yet, even notice-based
liability imposed on service providers has speech-unfriendly consequences. In such a regime, if
an affected individual has the right to demand that the ISP take down content that the individual
claims is harmful or illegal, the ISP’s obligation or incentive to remove such content -- outside
of a judicial determination of its illegality -- has deleterious effects on freedom of speech. As
one court explained:
[N]otice-based liability for [ISPs] would provide third parties with a no-cost means to
create the basis for future lawsuits. Whenever one was displeased with the speech of
another party conducted over an interactive computer service, the offended party could
simply "notify" the relevant service provider, claiming the information to be legally
defamatory. In light of the vast amount of speech communicated through interactive
computer services, these notices could produce an impossible burden for service
providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial
speech or sustaining prohibitive liability. [Such a result would dampen] the vigor of
Internet speech . . . .4
The United States has avoided such a speech-unfriendly system in cases where the
harm alleged is defamation or privacy violations. Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act5 broadly immunizes ISPs from both strict liability and liability upon notice by the affected
individual of the allegedly harmful material and immunizes ISPs from any responsibility for
facilitating access to allegedly harmful speech. This immunity extends even in cases where
ISPs edit, pre-screen, or pay third parties to create or submit, the allegedly harmful content in
4

Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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question. This immunity, while highly protective, has been extended quite broadly – even to
cases where the ISP is an active participant in the creation of the content and the content cannot
be fairly said to be provided by “another” information content provider. U.S. courts, in
interpreting Section 230, should scrutinize more closely whether the ISP has taken an active
role in creating harmful content and should not extend immunity from liability in such cases, in
order to strike the proper balance between protecting intermediaries and securing adequate
relief to parties harmed by such content.
The United States’s approach with respect to allegations of copyright infringement
achieves a result that is much less protective of free speech (and fair use). Under the United
States’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act,6 a copyright owner essentially has the right to
compel ISPs to remove content that he or she claims is infringing, without a judicial
determination of the infringing nature of the content. Section 512 of the DMCA grants service
providers a safe harbor to limit their liability for direct and indirect copyright infringement if
they agree to remove content that a copyright owner claims is infringing.7 Under the notice and
take down provisions of Section 512, a copyright owner may provide notice to a service
provider stating that he or she believes that the service provider is hosting or linking to
infringing content.8 Upon receipt of such notice, the service provider must expeditiously cease
hosting or linking to the allegedly infringing content in order to secure the benefits of the
statute’s limitations of liability. Although the statute also provides a mechanism for the Internet
user who made such content available to defend her use (via a “counter-notification”9), this
counter-notification mechanism is problematic, rarely invoked, and has had limited effect on the
censorship of content enabled under Section 512. Armed with the DMCA, copyright owners
today merely need to send a notice to the ISP requesting take down, and ISPs -- having the
incentive to secure the limitations of liability provided under Section 512 -- readily comply, by
“expeditiously” removing or disabling access to the content.10 In effect, this provision enables a
copyright owner to secure the equivalent of a temporary restraining order – a court order
mandating that the allegedly infringing content be removed -- but without benefit of judicial
process. Thousands of copyright owners have successfully induced ISPs to censor critical or
unflattering uses of their copyrighted content – even in cases where such uses would be
considered non-infringing, fair uses under the Copyright Act. Analyses of the thousands of uses
of Section 512 reveals a “high incidence of questionable uses of the process … to create
leverage in a competitive marketplace, to protect rights not given by copyright …, and to stifle

6

17 U.S.C. Sec. 512 (2000).
17 U.S.C. Sec. 512 (c)(1)(c).
8
17 U.S.C. Sec. 512 (c) (3).
9
17 U.S.C. Sec. 512 (g) (3) (c).
10
See Sec. 512 (c)(1)(c).
7

4

criticism, commentary and fair use, [resulting in a] continuous and perhaps unquantifiable effect
on public discourse.”11
The imposition of notice-based liability upon ISPs for hosting or linking to content that
is allegedly infringing leads to speech-unfriendly results. Allowing copyright owners to secure
the removal of allegedly infringing content without a judicial determination of the content’s
illegality is insufficiently protective of the free speech and fair use rights of internet users and is
not a model that should be replicated by other countries in the Americas.
As we have seen, laws incentivizing ISPs to take down allegedly harmful content
outside of the judicial process are highly problematic. Yet, even the judicial imposition of takedown obligations on ISPs can have speech-unfriendly consequences. In cases in Argentina and
Brazil, as will be discussed by other commentators, courts required ISPs to remove links to
websites containing famous names like Cicarelli and Maradona. In these cases, courts neglected
to narrowly tailor their orders to protect free speech rights and imposed broad take-down orders
on ISPs. In such cases, overbroad judicial take-down orders, as well as the ISPs’ overbroad
implementation of such orders, have led to severely speech unfriendly consequences.
To avoid such speech-unfriendly results, in regulating the Internet, governments should
refrain from passing legislation imposing intermediary liability – whether strict liability or
liability upon notice -- on ISPs for facilitating harmful third-party content. And, while courts
should have the power to impose take-down obligations in specific cases where ISPs host illegal
content, such take-down mandates should be crafted by courts and implemented by ISPs in the
most narrowly tailored and precise manner possible so as to avoid overblocking of protected
speech.
B. Governments Should Impose Net Neutrality Obligations on Broadband Service Providers
As I set forth in Part I.A., to protect the free flow of information on the Internet,
governments should pass legislation broadly immunizing ISPs from liability for hosting harmful
or illegal content. Conversely, governments should impose upon broadband service providers
the legal obligation to facilitate Internet users’ access to all legal content and should require
broadband service providers to serve as neutral conduits for such content, free from
discrimination or censorship. Because the Internet has become the most important medium for
individuals to express themselves and to communicate with others – in the Americas and
throughout the world -- it is imperative that Internet users enjoy a guarantee of free flow of
information and communication of ideas, free of censorship or discrimination by governments or
by the ISPs who are charged with facilitating such communications.
Just as telephone
companies, in the United States and other countries, have long been legally obligated to connect
11
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users’ calls and to otherwise facilitate communications free of censorship or discrimination, so
too should broadband service providers be required to facilitate the communication and exchange
of information without discrimination or censorship. This freedom to communicate has long
been essential to our liberal democratic way of life and must continue to be protected in the
Internet age.12
In the United States, the government historically has imposed affirmative obligations on
entities engaged in transportation, communications, and other important public service functions
to facilitate the free flow of information and commerce, free of censorship or discrimination.
Through this “common carriage doctrine,” the United States government has imposed
affirmative duties on entities that provide important communication and transportation functions
for the benefit of the public. Rather than granting conduits for communication the discretion to
regulate speech however they see fit, the common carriage doctrine implemented by U.S. courts
and legislatures requires that these entities facilitate all legal content on the same terms and
conditions.
In regulating broadband providers, governments should be guided by the principle that
underlies modern communications law and the common carriage doctrine -- that liberal
democracies require a well-informed citizenry, which in turn requires that citizens enjoy the
freedom to communicate and to access communications from a broad range of sources. The
same principles that justify regulating telephone companies as common carriers subject to
nondiscrimination requirements -- in order to “protect ordinary citizens in their right to
communicate”13 -- are relevant with regard to Internet communications.
Allowing broadband providers to discriminate against whatever content or applications
they choose for whatever reasons they choose is inconsistent with the historical progression of
according individuals protection in their freedom to communicate. Permitting broadband
providers to restrict the free flow of information and ideas enables these gatekeepers of speech to
thwart the “public discussion and informed deliberation that … democratic government
presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve.”14 Absent regulation, broadband
providers will enjoy the discretion to discriminate against the content or applications of their
choosing and citizens will not be guaranteed the access to a multiplicity of uncensored
viewpoints from diverse and antagonistic sources that is necessary for them to participate
meaningfully in democratic government. Instead, citizens will be increasingly limited to
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expression that is approved (or not disapproved) by the one or two broadband providers who
serve as gatekeepers for their Internet communications.
Broadband providers should therefore be subject to net neutrality regulations that require
them to assume at least the nondiscrimination obligations that historically have been imposed
upon other common carriers of communications – the duty to facilitate and transmit in a
nondiscriminatory manner any and all legal content and applications.
Such net neutrality regulations prohibiting broadband providers from blocking legal
content or applications should also mandate transparency in any such blocking, requiring
broadband providers to inform subscribers of any (illegal) content or applications that were
blocked and the reasons for such blocking (e.g., the provider claims that the content was illegal
because it contained child pornography or some other type of content deemed illegal in that
country). Mandating such transparency in blocking will enable users to impose checks on the
blocking decisions of broadband providers and ensure that such blocking does not mask the
provider’s unlawful discrimination on the basis of content. Internet users enjoy the right to
transparency in decisions affecting what content they can access and to be informed that content
or applications have been blocked and the reasons for such blocking, so that they can impose
checks on broadband providers’ discriminatory actions.
In summary, governments should pass legislation prohibiting broadband providers from
blocking legal content or applications and from engaging in discriminatory prioritization or
degradation of such content or applications. Such legislation should also mandate transparency
in blocking or degrading, requiring broadband providers meaningfully to inform Internet users of
any content or applications that were blocked or degraded and the reasons therefor, so that users
will be able to impose meaningful checks on these decisions of broadband providers and ensure
that such actions do not mask unlawful discrimination.
Several Latin America countries have led the way on net neutrality. As will be discussed
in this volume, Chile passed the world’s first net neutrality legislation, providing that its ISPs
“may not arbitrarily block, interfere with, discriminate against, hinder or restrict the right of any
Internet user to use, send, receive or offer any legal content, application or service on the
Internet, or any kind of legal Internet activity or use.”15 This mandate, however, is subject to the
exception allowing “Internet Access Providers [to] take any measure or action that may be
necessary for purposes of traffic management and network administration. . .” Colombia has
enacted a similar net neutrality law, but one that is not subject to this type of network
management exception. The Colombian law provides that “Internet Service Providers may not .
. . block, interfere with, discriminate against or restrict the right of any Internet user to use, send,
15
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receive or offer any lawful content, application or service on the Internet [and] may not make an
arbitrary distinction between content, applications or services on the basis of the origin or
ownership thereof.” The net neutrality legislation enacted in Chile and Colombia should serve as
a model for other countries in the hemisphere for the protection of Internet users’ right to
communicate on the Internet, free of discrimination or censorship.16 To fulfill the Internet’s
promise of being “the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country -- and
indeed the world – has yet seen,”17 those who serve as powerful gatekeepers for expression on
the Internet should be regulated to ensure that they act as good stewards within this marketplace
– free of discrimination and censorship, and true to the free speech values that are necessary to
facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation that democratic government
presupposes and that the free speech guarantee requires.
II. Governments Should Enact Protections for Anonymous Speech on the Internet
One of the most speech-enhancing features of the Internet is the ability of speakers to
speak critically, without fear of reprisal, about all manner of subjects – including their
governments and other matters of political and societal importance. Essential to this aspect of
freedom of Internet speech is the ability to speak anonymously or pseudonymously. Yet, several
countries in the Americas have enacted measures to restrict or prohibit anonymous speech, in
real space and in cyberspace. Venezuela’s Constitution, for example, prohibits anonymous
speech, everywhere.18 Brazil’s Constitution contains a similar prohibition on anonymous
speech.19 These types of restrictions on individuals’ ability to speak anonymously (or
pseudonymously) – on the Internet and elsewhere -- are inimical to the free speech guarantee and
should be revised. Instead, countries should provide meaningful protections for individuals’
right to communicate and express themselves anonymously on the Internet and in real space.

16

The United States’ Federal Communications Commission, after years of uncertainty and
vacillation, has finally published net neutrality rules, which will become effective in November
2011. These net neutrality rules (1) prohibit wireline or fixed broadband service providers from
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The experience of the United States, since its founding, demonstrates the importance of
governmental protections for the right to express oneself anonymously. Protections for
anonymous speech have been an important component of U.S. free speech jurisprudence since
the founding of the country. Throughout the history of the United States -- and indeed critical to
its formation and development as a liberal democracy -- the right of publishers and authors to
remain anonymous has served as an important component of the First Amendment right to
freedom of speech and of the press. As United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas
explained, summarizing relevant aspects of this history:
There is little doubt that the Framers engaged in anonymous political writing. The essays
in the Federalist Papers, published under the pseudonym of Publius, are only the most
famous example of the outpouring of anonymous political writing that occurred during
the ratification of the Constitution. . . The earliest and most famous American experience
with freedom of the press, the 1735 Zenger trial, centered around anonymous political
pamphlets. The case involved a printer, John Peter Zenger, who refused to reveal the
anonymous authors of published attacks on the Crown governor of New York. . . . The
case . . . signified at an early moment the extent to which anonymity and the freedom of
the press were intertwined in the early American mind.20
Protecting the anonymity of publishers and authors serves two fundamental purposes:
First, protecting speakers’ anonymity allows the content of a speaker’s message to be evaluated
on its merits instead of in the context of the identity or reputation of the author.21 Second,
protecting speakers’ anonymity allows proponents of unpopular positions or causes to express
their views without fear of personal reprisal.22 As such, the protection of anonymous speech is
critical to fulfilling the countermajoritarian function of the First Amendment by insulating
speakers of unpopular messages from the potential threat of reprisal. As the United States
Supreme Court explained in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,23 drawing from the theory
of free speech set forth by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty24:
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 350 (1995).
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Id. at 334 (“Anonymity provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to
ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its
proponent.”). See also Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and The
Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 144 (1996).
22
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144 (observing that “one obvious cost of regulating anonymity is potential retaliation against the
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Anonymous speech is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable
tradition of advocacy and dissent. Anonymity is a shield from tyranny of the
majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation – and
their ideas from suppression – at the hand of an intolerant society.25
If speakers’ anonymity is not protected, advocates of unpopular ideas will often be dissuaded
from speaking, thereby impoverishing the marketplace of ideas. As United States Supreme Court
Justice Hugo Black explained Talley v. California,26 “persecuted groups and sects from time to
time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all.”27 The protection for anonymous speech is thus a critical component
of an expressive public forum in which individuals can share their opinions with others free of
personal reprisal, and have their opinions be evaluated on their own merits.
Although these justifications for protecting anonymous speech are strongest with respect
to political speech, the First Amendment’s protections for anonymous speech extend to other
types of speech as well. As the United States Supreme Court explained in McIntyre:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures, and even books have played an
important role in the progress of mankind. . . . The author’s decision in favor of
anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by
concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s
privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may be, . . . the interest in having
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any
public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry. Accordingly, an
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions
or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment.28
Anonymity thus protects an author’s prerogative in defining how to present her ideas to the
world. As such, anonymity “safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is
central to any concept of liberty.”29
25

514 U.S. at 347.

26
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362 U.S. at 64. See Tien, supra, at 128-29 (explaining that McIntyre is about “fear of
viewpoint discrimination, because anonymity is historically tied to the ability of the unpopular
and persecuted to criticize oppressive practices and laws.”)
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Notwithstanding the importance of protecting anonymous expression, governments
throughout the Americas have attempted to erode this protection and to compel the disclosure of
the speakers’ and publishers’ identities in the name of various countervailing interests. For
example, in McIntyre, the legislature sought to justify a prohibition on the anonymous
distribution of campaign literature on the grounds, inter alia, that compelling disclosure of
speakers’ identities was necessary to prevent fraud and libel.30 While recognizing the importance
of such state interests, the United States Supreme Court found that the state had sufficient means
of directly protecting against fraud and libel in the relevant contexts, and that the state’s ban on
anonymous campaign literature was an indirect and insufficiently narrowly tailored means of
advancing these important state interests.31 While the state’s interest in preventing fraud and libel
might justify a more limited disclosure requirement,32 the Supreme Court found that State’s total
ban on anonymous pamphleteering was unjustified.33
The First Amendment right to speak anonymously has also been specifically recognized
in the context of Internet communications. In a case that involved the right to speak
anonymously in the specific context of Internet communications, the State of Georgia was found
to have run afoul of the First Amendment in attempting to prohibit all anonymous and
pseudonymous Internet communications. In Zell v. Miller,34 Georgia made it a crime falsely to
identify one’s name (and hence to communicate pseudonymously or anonymously) for the
purpose of electronically transmitting data, such as via email. Relying upon McIntyre, the court
struck down this statute, holding that it impermissibly burdened the constitutional “right to
30

514 U.S. at 342.

31

Id. at 344.

32

Id.
Id. See also Watchtower Bible Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Village of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). In Watchtower, the Supreme Court rejected the locality’s
justification for mandating disclosure of the identity and affiliation of door-to-door canvassers.
In Watchtower, the Village of Stratton, Ohio, attempted to justify this disclosure requirement,
inter alia, on the grounds of preventing fraud and crime. The Supreme Court found that the
complete ban on anonymous door-to-door canvassing that the regulation effected – which
applied not only to commercial transactions and to the solicitation of funds, but also to religious
and political canvassers and others seeking to enlist support for their causes – was insufficiently
narrowly tailored to advance the locality’s important interests. Accordingly, the locality’s total
ban on anonymous door-to-door canvassing was found to be unjustified and its mandatory
disclosure requirement for door-to-door canvassers was invalidated.

33
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See Zell v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N. D. Ga. 1997). See also American Civil Liberties
Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (1996) (recognizing importance of online anonymity to
speakers who seek access to sensitive information), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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communicate anonymously and pseudonymously over the Internet.”35 While crediting the state’s
compelling interest in preventing fraud in Internet communications, the court nevertheless found
that the statute’s blanket prohibition on anonymous and pseudonymous Internet communications
was not narrowly tailored to advance this compelling state interest.
Of course, there will be instances when a plaintiff will eventually need to discover the
identity of a speaker whose content is alleged to be illegal and harmful to plaintiff. Protections
for anonymous speech are not absolute and can be lifted, but only in conjunction with requisite
judicial procedures that are sensitive to the interests of both plaintiffs in seeking meaningful
relief and of defendants in securing continued protection for their free speech rights to the
greatest extent possible. Allowing an aggrieved party to proceed initially against an anonymous
John Doe defendant, and enabling a judge to determine whether to compel an Internet
intermediary to disclose the identity of the anonymous speaker, adequately balances the interests
of both sides.
United States courts’ efforts to balance Internet users’ right to communicate
anonymously against other individuals’ property, reputational, and privacy rights are
instructive in this regard. In a series of recent cases in which plaintiffs alleged that they were
defamed by anonymous Internet postings and sought to discover the identities of the individuals
responsible for such postings from the relevant Internet Service Providers, courts have imposed
stringent requirements on plaintiffs’ efforts to discover the identities of such individuals. For
example, in Doe v.2TheMart.com, the plaintiff, who claimed that she was defamed by an
anonymous post, sought to discover from the ISP the identity of an alleged defamatory poster.
The court imposed stringent standards on plaintiff’s ability to discover the poster’s identity in
order to protect the poster’s right to engage in anonymous speech. Holding that “discovery
requests seeking to identify anonymous Internet users must be subject to careful scrutiny by the
courts,” the court set forth a demanding multifactor test for evaluating whether plaintiff’s need
for such information outweighed the poster’s right to speak anonymously.36 Only upon satisfying
this heightened showing would plaintiff’s right to access such information in order to prosecute
her defamation action be found to outweigh defendant’s right to speak anonymously. Similarly,
in the recent decision in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,37 that court articulated the
following stringent standard for judges to apply in determining whether to compel disclosure of
the identity of an anonymous Internet speaker:
When a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in which anonymous

35

Zell v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228.
See 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001). Under this four part test, the court will
inquire into the following factors in considering whether a subpoena for the identity of non-party
Internet speakers should be upheld: “(1) Was the subpoena brought in good faith? (2) Does the
information relate to a core claim or defense? (3) Is the identifying information directly and
materially relevant to that claim or defense? (4) Is the information available from other sources?”
36
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speakers or pseudonyms are involved, it should: (1) require the plaintiff to
undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a
subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, . . .; (2) withhold action to
afford the anonymous posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition to the application; (3) require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the
exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster, alleged to
constitute actionable speech; (4) determine whether the complaint has set forth a
prima facie defamation . . . action against the anonymous posters; and (5), if all
else is satisfied, balance the anonymous poster’s First Amendment right of free
speech against the strength of the prima facie case of defamation presented by the
plaintiff and the necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity,
prior to ordering disclosure.
In summary, the United States since its founding has consistently accorded meaningful
protections for anonymous speech. Protection for a speaker’s anonymity is a fundamental part of
the First Amendment right to freedom of expression. This protection has extended to Internet
speech as well, and has been carefully guarded by courts in balancing the interests of parties
aggrieved by such speech against speakers’ interest in anonymity. The United States’s approach
should serve as a model for other countries in the Americas in extending protection to speakers
for their right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously on the Internet.
III. Governments Should Be Restricted in Filtering Internet Content
In addition to ensuring that service providers do not restrict the free flow of information
on the Internet, it is imperative that governments themselves are restricted in their ability to
censor Internet content – even content that is deemed illegal within a given country. A growing
number of countries are filtering speech on the Internet in a variety of ways and this form of
censorship has become a powerful tool for many governments – dictatorships and democracies
alike – to control what ideas and information their citizens access.38 Venezuela seems poised to
join this growing number of countries. Given the extent and effectiveness of efforts to censor
Internet speech throughout the world, protectors of free speech can no longer rest comfortably on
the assurance issued by Internet pioneer John Gilmore two decades ago that "the Net interprets
censorship as damage and routes around it."39 Pervasive Internet censorship has extended well
beyond the usual suspects – China, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, etc. – to less likely suspects like
the U.K., Canada, and Australia. Although free speech advocates broadly denounce such
censorship, it is likely that many countries – having seized upon powerful filtering tools -- will
38

See Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values and
Internet Censorship Worldwide, [cite]. Some of the material in this section has been reprinted
from this Article.
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continue to restrict Internet content to prohibit their citizens from accessing speech that is
deemed harmful or illegal within their countries. Two responses to such censorship can be
pursued: (1) continuing to broadly denounce all Internet censorship or (2) advocating for
countries at the very least to restrain themselves in restricting Internet speech, to do so as
narrowly and precisely as possible, consistent with shared notions of due process. In what
follows, I pursue the second approach. While it is not surprising that different countries, given
their different histories and national experiences, will espouse different substantive values
regarding which speech to restrict -- for example, how to define and whether to restrict hate
speech, incitement, Holocaust denial, pornography, child pornography etc.40 -- in implementing
their prohibitions on such categories of speech, I argue that countries should adhere strictly to
fundamental requirements of due process to ensure that their citizens who are subject to such
speech restrictions (1) have notice of such restrictions, (2) that any prohibited categories of
speech are defined with precision and clarity, such that (3) those subject to such speech
restrictions have a meaningful opportunity to secure prompt judicial review of any such
decisions to restrict speech.
Protections for free speech have not only substantive dimensions of which categories of
speech to protect and which to restrict – which differ from country to country -- but such
protections also have important procedural dimensions, which mandate – in the words of the
United States Supreme Court -- that “sensitive tools” be implemented to distinguish between
instances of protected and unprotected speech.41 Such procedures and sensitive tools for
protecting free speech are as important as the substantive protections themselves. In the words
of United States Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter, “[t]he history of American freedom is, in no
small part, the history of procedure.”42 In particular, courts in the United States in advancing our
substantive free speech values have applied stringent procedural safeguards in scrutinizing prior
restraints on speech – restraints on speech that are imposed prior to a judicial determination of
the speech’s illegality – and have looked upon such restrictions with great disfavor. This strong
presumption against the legality of prior restraints is also shared by the Latin American countries
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The American Convention on Human Rights, for example, which protects “the right to
freedom of thought and expression,” provides that this right does not prohibit subsequent
imposition of liability to the extent necessary to ensure “respect for the rights or
reputations of others” or “the protection of national security, public order, or public
health or morals.” The Convention further provides that “[a]ny propaganda for war and
any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless
violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any
grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be
considered as offenses punishable by law.”
41
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that have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which provides that “the right to
freedom of thought an expression . . . shall not be subject to prior censorship . . . .”43
Nationwide filtering systems impose “prior restraints” -- or restraints on speech prior to a
judicial determination of the speech’s illegality. Instead of imposing punishment on such speech
after it has been published and adjudicated illegal by a court, these systems regulate the speech at
issue before a court has made the determination that such speech is illegal. The procedural
framework adopted in the United States for assessing the legality of prior restraints provides a
helpful starting point for countries seeking to impose meaningful constraints on government
blocking or filtering of Internet content. Translated into the context of nationwide filtering or
blocking of Internet speech, these safeguards require, first, that any filtering be imposed subject
to clear and precise definitions of the speech to be regulated; second, that the filtering scheme
operate in an open and transparent manner, such that affected Internet users and content
providers are provided with notice that the content was blocked and the reason for such blocking;
and third, that the filtering scheme provide Internet users and content providers with the
opportunity to appeal any such blocking decisions, to a judicial body and in an expeditious
manner. These procedures do not themselves dictate what categories of speech are to be
restricted or what categories of speech are to be deemed harmful. Rather, they impose
meaningful, process-based safeguards on the implementation of restrictions of whatever
categories of speech are deemed harmful by any particular government.

43

Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides, in full:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other
medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject
to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall
be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the
abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies,
or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to
impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be
subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for
the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that
constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any
person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion,
language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.
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To understand what is at stake in such a system, and how lack of transparency and openness
implicates the rights of Internet users, consider the operation of a filtering scheme translated to
the real space context. Imagine a vast real space forum for authors and readers in which millions
of authors bring their books to be made available for billions of potentially interested readers.
The authors place their books on the bookshelves of the forum and then depart. Billions of
readers also come to the forum to search for books of potential interest to them. Unbeknownst to
either the authors or the readers, before the content of any book is made available to the readers –
or at some point after the books are placed on the bookshelves – the books are scrutinized by
unseen and unknown censors to determine whether the content is “permissible,” according to
some criteria that are unstated and undiscoverable. If these censors determine that a book or
some of its content is impermissible, it is placed on a blacklist and removed from circulation.
When the readers enter the forum to select books of potential interest to them, they do not know
which books have been removed, nor do the authors of the banned books ever learn whether (and
why) their book has been removed. This scenario replicates in real space what occurs in
cyberspace under filtering systems when websites are placed on blacklists and the country’s
Internet users are prohibited from accessing such content.
In terms of the real space censoring scenario outlined above, it is important to understand
that whether the restrictions imposed by the licensing scheme occur ex ante – before any reader
has an opportunity to access the books’ contents – or whether the restrictions occur at some point
after the initial circulation of the books’ contents, both types of restrictions would constitute
presumptively unconstitutional prior restraints. Ex ante prior restraints include those imposed by
censorship boards responsible for screening content (such as motion pictures) before they are
made available to the public,44 and filtering schemes that are imposed ex ante, such as filters
imposed by governments (in China, for example) for specific words or phrases deemed harmful.
Midstream prior restraints, in contrast, include those restraints on speech that are imposed after
initial circulation but sometime before a judicial determination that the speech is illegal has been
made. Because midstream prior restraints are imposed prior to a judicial determination of the
content’s illegality, they are as constitutionally suspect as ex ante prior restraints. Midstream
prior restraints include filtering systems that work from evolving blacklists of websites that are
maintained in response to tips or complaints from web users.
The United States Supreme Court considered an example of midstream prior restraints in
the case of Bantam Books v. Sullivan.45 In Bantam Books, the Rhode Island Commission to
Encourage Morality in Youth was charged with investigating and recommending prosecution of
booksellers for the distribution of printed works that were obscene or indecent. The Commission
reviewed books and magazines after they were already in circulation, and took it upon itself to
notify distributors in cases in which a book or magazine had been distributed that the
44
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Series C, No. 73 (in which the Chilean Cinematographic Classification Council [Consejo
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Commission deemed objectionable. In reviewing the constitutionality of this scheme, the
Supreme Court held that, even though the restrictions on publication were imposed after initial
circulation and distribution, the Commission’s actions nonetheless effectuated an
unconstitutional prior restraint. The Court explained that “the separation of legitimate from
illegitimate speech calls for . . . . sensitive tools” and reiterated its insistence that regulations of
speech “scrupulously embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards.”46 The Court observed
that, under the Rhode Island scheme, “the publisher or distributor is not even entitled to notice
and hearing before his publications are listed by the Commission as objectionable” and that there
was “no provision whatever for judicial superintendence before notices issue or even for judicial
review of the Commission’s determinations of objectionableness.” Accordingly, the Court
concluded that, in the context of this system of midstream prior restraint, the “procedures of the
Commission are radically deficient” and unconstitutional.
1. Openness and Transparency within Filtering Systems
Bantam Books, as well as other cases invalidating systems of prior restraints, teach that in
order for any system of prior restraint to embody the requisite procedural safeguards, the affected
parties must at a minimum be made aware of such a decision to censor so that they can
effectively challenge it. This, in turn, presupposes that affected parties have notice of any such
censorship so that they can be secured a meaningful opportunity to challenge the initial decision
to censor in a judicial forum. Filtering systems in which the affected parties are not made aware
that content has been filtered fail this threshold requirement. Surprisingly, on this score of
openness/transparency versus secrecy/opaqueness in the operation of filtering systems, some of
the most speech-repressive countries fare better than some liberal democracies. Saudi Arabia,
for example, while implementing a very restrictive system of government-mandated Internet
filtering consistent with its overall restrictive religious society, nonetheless operates its filtering
system in a transparent and open manner, and appears to provide Saudi users with meaningful
notice that their Internet access is being restricted in general, as well with notice of specific acts
of filtering in particular. Although Saudi Arabia’s Internet restrictions are hostile to free speech
on a number of metrics,47 these restrictions operate in a transparent and open manner, providing
citizens with clear notice of what Internet speech is being restricted and the asserted justifications
for such restrictions. When content is blocked in Saudi Arabia (as it frequently is), the Saudi
government is very clear about the mechanism by which it effectuates this filtering. It explains
to Internet users that “KACST [King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology] maintains a
central log and specialized proxy equipment, which processes all page requests from within the
46

Id. at 66.
For example, a 2008 Saudi law on the use of technology provides substantial penalties (five
years imprisonment and a fine) for the use of the Internet to distribute content such as
pornography or other materials that violate public law, religious values, or the social standards of
the kingdom. See Access Controlled, Saudi Arabia chapter. Web sites relating to alternative
religions (such as those discussing conversion from Islam to Christianity), web sites espousing
critical views of Islam, web sites relating to minority Shia groups, sites of global free speech
advocates, web sites relating to gay and lesbian issues, sex education and family planning, have
all been blocked. See id. at 566-67.
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country and compares them to a black list of banned sites. If the requested page is included in
the black list then it is dropped.”48 Regarding its justifications for filtering, the government
explains on its official filtering webpage that:
God Almighty directed humanity in the Noble Qur’an in the words of His prophet
Joseph: He said, My Lord, prison is more beloved to me than that to which they
entice me, and were you not to divert their plot away from me I will be drawn
towards them and be of the ignorant. So his Lord answered him and diverted their
plot away from him, truly, He is the All-Hearer, the All-Knower.” Yusuf (12):3334.49
When a Saudi Internet user seeks to access a website that is on the blacklist, the user receives a
notice, in both English and in Arabic, that “access to the requested URL is not allowed.”50
Further, any Internet user receiving such a message and seeking to appeal the blocking decision
is instructed that he or she can submit an unblocking request “by using the special forms set up
for such requests on the ISU web page.”51
Similarly, in Finland, users seeking to access content that has been blocked by the
nationwide Internet filtering system receive the following message, specifically notifying them
that the website they are seeking to access has been blocked:
POLICE.
ENTRY DENIED. Your browser has tried to access a site for which the access
has been prevented due to the act on preventive measures on distribution of child
pornography. The police maintains and updates a list of these child pornography
sites.52
In contrast, other countries are far more opaque and secretive in their implementation of
filtering systems, and operate in such a manner that their Internet users are not made aware that
the website they are requesting has been blocked, nor even that the country is implementing a
nationwide Internet filtering system. In the United Kingdom, for example, which generally has
meaningful guarantees of freedom of expression, the nation’s ISPs have for the past seven years
been implementing a nationwide Internet filtering program that operates in a nontransparent
manner. The vast majority of British ISPs implement the “Cleanfeed” system to block access to
websites that have been deemed potentially illegal by the Internet Watch Foundation, a private
organization that maintains a list of URLs that are suspected of hosting illegal content that falls
into one of the (expanding) categories of child sexual abuse, promoting racial hatred, or hosting
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criminally obscene adult content.53 Apparently, the vast majority of U.K. Internet users are
unaware that their Internet search results are being filtered in this manner.54 Furthermore, the
ISPs’ implementation of Cleanfeed does not inform Internet users when the sites they have
requested are filtered or blocked. Instead, when a U.K. user attempts to access a website that the
IWF has placed on the blacklist, the user (at least some of the time) receives a generic 404/“file
not found” Internet error message, which conveys no information to the Internet user that the
website has been placed on the blacklist.55 In the words of commentator Lilian Edwards, the
U.K. Cleanfeed system “could be the most perfectly invisible censorship mechanism ever
invented.”56
The U.K.’s model of silent, opaque filtering has been influential in other European
countries and has also been adopted in Canada. In 2006, Canada’s largest ISPs launched Project
Cleanfeed Canada, which is modeled explicitly on the UK Cleanfeed project, in conjunction with
Cybertip.ca, a Canadian police organization. As in the UK, analysts from Cybertip.ca make
determinations as to content that is potentially illegal and place suspected URLs on the
Cleanfeed distribution list. Canadian ISPs then block URLs that have been placed on the
Cleanfeed distribution list.57 And, as in the UK, Internet users are not informed that the content
they are searching for has been filtered. Rather, Internet users receive a standard Internet error
message that the website they are seeking is unavailable.58
Countries implementing nationwide filtering systems to restrict their citizens’ access to
content that they deem harmful should at the very least operate these systems in an open and
transparent manner, consistent with fundamental procedural due process requirements. These
systems should operate in a manner such that (1) Internet users are made aware of the operation
of such filtering systems generally, and (2) affected users are specifically informed of instances
53
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in which the filters operate to block access to a particular website. Only then can affected
content providers and users have the meaningful notice necessary to challenge the decision to
censor, and subject the decision to judicial review.
2. Any Categories of Prohibited Speech Should Be Clearly Defined and Delineated
Another threshold procedural requirement for any system of filtering Internet content is
that the censor’s discretion be meaningfully constrained by clearly defined and precise
guidelines. Such a requirement serves to cabin and constrain the discretion of the initial censor
and require that they adhere to the legal determination of what content is proscribable. While
countries may reasonably differ in their determinations of what categories of speech are illegal
content – pornography, hate speech, Holocaust denial, etc. – it is important that, within each
country, the definitions of illegal speech – and especially definitions of any illegal speech
subject to prior restraint -- be carefully and precisely defined so as to constrain the initial
censor’s discretion. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has strictly scrutinized the
discretion of censors in systems of prior restraint and has rejected as unconstitutional any
systems that reposit unbounded discretion to determine whether or not speech is protected. For
example, in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,59 the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a parade
permitting system that vested the City Commission with the broad discretion to deny parade
permits in cases where “in [the Commission’s] judgment the public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that [the parade permit] be
refused.”60 In ruling on a challenge to the statute, the Court held that, because the permitting
scheme constituted a prior restraint on expression that conferred “virtually unbridled and
absolute power” on the Commission, it failed to comport with the essential due process
requirement that any law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior
restraint of a license must embody “narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority.”61
Requiring that the criteria by which the censoring authority makes the decision to censor
be set forth with precision helps to cabin administrative discretion and also helps to limit
“mission creep” within the censoring body. Without a precise and detailed specification of the
criteria for censorship, the censor can exercise unbridled discretion to restrict speech.
Not surprisingly, countries that filter Internet content the most extensively also have the
broadest and vaguest definitions of content subject to censorship. China, for example, imposes
mandatory filters on content that “disrupts the solidarity of peoples,” “jeopardizes the integrity of
national unity,” or “harms national honor or interests.”62 Similarly, as discussed above,
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Venezuela intends to establish an Internet chokepoint at its border to block its citizens from
accessing speech that is “aimed at creating social unrest or disturbing public order.”63 The
examples from China and Venezuela embody precisely the sort of standardless discretion that
fails to impose any meaningful constraints on censors and fails to provide affected Internet users
with notice of which speech is subject to censorship.
Filtering Schemes Should Provide for Appealability of Filtering Determinations
Due process considerations in the free speech context further require that any initial
decision to censor be subject to prompt judicial review in an adversary proceeding. United
States courts have emphasized the importance of the availability of expeditious judicial review of
censorship determinations in the prior restraint context.64 As the United States Supreme Court
explained, “because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial
determination suffices to impose a valid final [prior] restraint."65 In order for a filtering system
to effectuate a valid prior restraint, such a system needs to provide for notice to the affected

endangering state security, divulging state secrets, subverting the national regime,
or jeopardizing the integrity of national unity;
- harming national honor or interests;
- inciting hatred against peoples, racism against peoples, or disrupting the solidarity
of peoples;
- disrupting national policies on religion, propagating evil cults and feudal
superstitions;
- spreading rumors, disturbing social order, or disrupting social stability;
- spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, terror, or abetting the
commission of a crime;
- insulting or defaming third parties, infringing on legal rights and interests of third
parties;
- other content prohibited by law and administrative regulations;
- inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, or gatherings
that disturb social order; and
conducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization. See Access
Controlled, supra, at 478.
63
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parties and an opportunity to secure the expeditious judicial review of an initial censorship
decision.66
Attempts within the U.S. to impose ISP filters on harmful Internet speech have been
found to be unconstitutional because they have failed to provide for judicial review (prompt or
otherwise) in an adversary proceeding of the decision to censor. In the Center for Democracy
and Technology v. Pappert, for example, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sought to combat
online child pornography by enacting the Internet Child Pornography Act, which required ISPs
serving Pennsylvanians to block access to websites allegedly associated with child pornography.
The Act permitted the Pennsylvania Attorney General or Pennsylvania district attorneys to seek
an ex parte court order requiring an ISP to remove or disable access to items accessible through
the ISP’s service, upon a showing of probable cause that the item constitutes child pornography.
The Act did not require an actual, final determination that the material to be removed actually
constituted child pornography before it was placed on the blacklist. In consultation with the
affected ISPs, the Attorney General’s office decided to implement the Act by proceeding without
even securing ex parte court orders and instead by providing “Informal Notices of Child
Pornography” to ISPs that hosted websites that were reported by an agent or a citizen and that
the Office of the Attorney General had identified as suspected child pornography. The Informal
Notice directed the ISP to remove or disable Pennsylvania citizens’ access to the suspected
material within five days of receipt of Notice.
The statute was challenged, inter alia, as an unconstitutional prior restraint lacking the
requisite procedural safeguards. In defense of the statute, the attorney general explained that
only material that its office had probable cause to believe constituted child pornography was
requested to be removed. The court found that the probable cause showing did not save the
statute (nor did the fact that the attorney general only issued “Informal Notices” not court orders,
and that the process was therefore “voluntary” not coercive67). First, the court explained that in
66
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order to comply with the Supreme Court’s exacting requirements, to be constitutional, a valid
final prior restraint must be imposed by a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding. The
attorney general’s determination that there was probable cause that the material was illegal was
insufficient. Further, even an ex parte judicial determination that the material was illegal would
not suffice to impose a constitutional final prior restraint because it did not result from an
adversarial proceeding. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Freedman, “only a
judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression.”68 Ex parte judicial determinations that are made in the absence of notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the part of the adversely-affected speaker are constitutionally
deficient, and ex parte nonjudicial determinations are constitutionally deficient by an even
greater measure.
Under many of the filtering systems implemented in other countries, provisions do exist
for some sort of appeal of the censorship decision. However, such provisions for appeal
generally do not provide for judicial determination and instead merely provide for a second look
by the administrative body that made the censorship determination in the first place. In the UK,
for example, the IWF website indicates that “any party with a legitimate association with the
[blacklisted] content . . . who believes they are being prevented from accessing legal content may
appeal [broken link] against the accuracy of an assessment.69 The appeal procedure provided by
the IWF, however, does not contemplate judicial review. (Further, as discussed above, it is
unclear how a party would learn that the content she was seeking, or seeking to make available,
was subject to the IWF’s blacklist, since the Cleanfeed system merely provides Internet users
with a generic 404/File not found error message when a requested website is on the IWF
blacklist.) Rather, the appeal involves a second look by the IWF itself, and following that, a
review by a police agency, whose assessment is final.70 Similarly, the Canadian Cybertip
filtering system allows for an affected content provider to appeal the initial censorship decision,
but that appeals process also does not contemplate judicial review. Rather, the Canadian appeals
process provides for a second look by Cybertip Canada personnel, and then ultimately to a
review by National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre – a branch of the Canadian Police
Centre for Missing and Exploited Children71 -- whose decision is final.72 Such provisions for
explained that removal requests issued by law enforcement officials were not interpreted by the
recipient ISPs as being voluntary, even if technically they did not have the force of law.
68
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appeal – because they do not provide for a judicial determination of the affected parties’ rights –
fail to accord the requisite protections for freedom of expression.
In summary, nationwide filtering systems – the likes of which are now being imposed by
over 40 countries worldwide, and whose numbers Venezuela apparently seeks to join – embody
prior restraints on speech, which are inconsistent with the commitments articulated in the
American Convention on Human Rights and which violate the due process requirements inherent
in the free speech guarantee, absent the inclusion of fundamental process-based safeguards.
These free speech due process requirements mandate that such prior restraints implemented by
filtering systems be imposed subject to clear and precise definitions of the speech to be
regulated; implemented in an open and transparent manner, such that affected Internet users and
content providers are provided with information that the content was blocked and the reason for
such blocking; and such that the filtering system provide Internet users and content providers
with the opportunity to appeal any such blocking decisions, to a judicial body and in an
expeditious manner. Only such “sensitive tools” for distinguishing between protected speech
and unprotected speech can adequately protect individuals’ free speech rights.
Conclusion
To preserve and protect the Internet as a forum for the uninhibited, robust, and wideopen exchange of ideas and information in the Americas, governments must take active steps to
facilitate such free speech values. The relationship between governments and Internet service
providers is of pre-eminent importance in this regard, as ISPs are in the position to be the
facilitators of the free flow of information and ideas. On the one hand, ISPs should not be
shackled with intermediary liability for hosting harmful content. On the other hand, ISPs should
not be granted the discretion to restrict communications flowing through their pipes that they
disfavor for one reason or another; rather, they should be subject to meaningful net neutrality
regulations requiring them to facilitate all communications without discrimination or censorship.
To encourage the free flow of information on the Internet, governments should also provide
protections to Internet users to speak anonymously or pseudonymously. Such protections are
integral to the right to speak critically in the political and civil realms, and should be preserved in
the Internet age. Finally, governments themselves should not engage in censorship of Internet
speech, consistent with our shared commitment in the Americas to forgo prior restraints on
expression. However, if countries do engage in any filtering of unlawful Internet content – as
many countries throughout the world are now doing – they should ensure that such statemandated filtering systems adhere to the most speech-protective procedures and “sensitive tools”
for distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech.
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New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (describing “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen”).
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